Kripkenstein: Rule and Indeterminacy :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

Kripkenstein Rule and IndeterminacyABSTRACT Indeterminacy theories, such as Wittgensteins and Kripkes indeterminacy principle on rules and language and Quines indeterminacy of radical translation, raise some fundamental questions on our knowledge and understanding. In this paper we try to outline and interpret Wittgensteins and Kripkes indeterminacy, and then contrast it to some other related theories on indeterminacy of human thinking, such as raised by Hume, Quine, and Goodman. Quines indeterminacy differs from Wittgensteins in several aspects. First, Wittgenstein and Kripkes indeterminacy applies to a single individual in isolation and this indeterminacy disappears when the single person is brought into a wider community. Thus, this indeterminacy is only logically possible or hypothetical. Second, in Quines problem, ii translation manuals are distinguishable while Wittgensteins hypotheses, such as plus and quus and many others, are indistinguishable for the subjects past and the subject would never aware of the distinctions. Third, in Wittgensteins view, whether a member follows the rules or not can be determined by outward criterion. Quines indeterminacy denies the existence of such outward criterion for his two translation manuals. Goodmans hypothesis of grue is quite antithetic from the above two indeterminacy in terms of both objective of introducing the concept and the usage of it. Goodmans issue is to search for the rules in screening out bad assumptions in induction. This induction issue is not indeterminacy of Wittgensteins skeptic arguments or Quines radical translation. Wittgenstein and Kripkes conclusion that that rules are brute facts seems to be questionable. Form of life is one of Wittgensteins winder concepts in his theory on rules and is linked to rules in some crucial focuss. A community cannot agree on arbitrary rules and rules other than some extremely selected ones cannot bind a community together. What a community agree or disagree is not an arbitrary game.Kripke presents Wittgensteins theory on rules in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The topic is difficult and the presentation seems to inherit some characteristics of the original work, which is not presented in the form of a deductive argument with definitive theses as conclusions,... (Kripke, 1982, p.3). Kripke tells the reader The point to be made here is that, at the same time the second part is important for an ultimate understanding of the first. (1982, p.84) In this way the relation ship between the first and the second portions... is reciprocal. (1982, p.85). We find that a reciprocal reading helps me to understand and absorb the main points and arguments.